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EFFICIENCY ASPECTS OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT:
THE CASE OF THE NORTH SEA
I. Introduction
1 . Objective
In the case of fisheries, the lack of an efficient property
rights structure (uniform, exclusive, and transferable pro-
perty rights) is widely recognized as the prime impediment
to higher profitability of the fishing industry and to the
prevention of over-exploitation. This study uses an empiri-
cal model for measuring the economic efficiency implications
of the competitive exploitation of a commonly shared fishery,
While lack of data prevents the empirical application of
theoretical state-of-the-art fishery models, the specifica-
tion of the model used here does not prevent an analysis
of the central efficiency question. Within a 'surplus-pro-
duction' model of the North Sea fishery, economically opti-
mal levels of fishing effort, cost, revenue, and rent are
estimated. These are compared with activity levels that are
considered optimal in the biological sense.
The paper begins with a review of the optimality conditions.
Section II presents an empirical model, whose application to
the multi-species North Sea fishery is discussed in Section
III. Section IV presents empirical results.2. Optimality Conditions
As a renewable resource, the stock of fish is dependent on
the stock's rate of reproduction, the rate of natural mor-
tality, and the intensity of fishing. Thus, the population
dynamics of a fishery can be represented by
|| = g(B) - f (E, B) (.1)
where g(B) is the net natural growth of the stock B (repro-
duction minus mortality) and f(E, B) is the attrition of
the stock due to fishing, which, in turn, depends on the
stock size, B, and on the amount of resources used in fishe-
ry, as represented in the composite factor "fishing effort",
E.
Optimality in resource use requires maximization of its pre-
sent value. With perfect competition in product and factor
markets, the present value of the resource is
J |p . f (E, B) - w . E~| . e~
<S
t dt (2)
where 6 is the social rate of discount and w is the constant
unit cost of fishing effort. Maximization of the present value
subject to condition (1) yields the economically optimal level
of fishing. This is equivalent to an optimal control problem
where the Hamiltonian
H = |p . f(E, B) - w . E| . e~
6
t + A|g(B) - f(E, BY | (3)
For extensive discussions and a survey of fishery econo-
mics, see Clark (1976) and Peterson and Fisher (1977).- 3 -
2 is maximized . A is the marginal user cost of the resource
in situ (uncaught fish), representing the amount by which
the present value is changed if the stock size changes by
one unit.
For a dynamic optimum, the following necessary conditions
have to be satisfied:
HE = (p . fE - w) . e~
6
t - AfE = 0 (4)
§£ = -H = -p . f e"
6
t - A(gB - f ) (5)
at bo u b
which imply





Marginal user cost falls as the social rate of discount rises.
Substitution of (6) into (4) yields the optimum condition :
P = !L









 (fB " V
For the exploitation of the fishery to be at the optimal level
price has to be equal to the sum of marginal harvesting cost
(w/fF) and marginal user cost at any given movement of time.
2
In the maximum principle problem E is the control variable,
B is the state variable, and X is the costate variable.
The optimum condition can alternatively be expressed as:
g. = 6 -
 w •
 fB
P • % - » '
which implies that the fish stock should be maintained at
the level of the maximum growth if both discount rate and
harvesting cost are zero, and that it should be reduced from
the level of the maximum growth if harvesting cost alone is
assumed to be zero.- 4 -
Empirical studies of fisheries face the problem that mar-
ginal user cost cannot be observed directly. In this study,
it is assumed that the social rate of discount is zero,
which in turn leads to an overestimate of marginal user
cost. While this assumption, which renders the above model
empirically applicable, may appear to be rather extreme,
Hanneson (1974) provides empirical evidence that the fishing
level in the absence of discounting will, in fact, not dif-
fer much from the optimal level when a discount rate of 10 %
4
is used . With future net benefits not being discounted at
all, this assumption is equivalent to maximization of sta-
tionary rent. Under these stationary conditions, the optimum
condition is
p = w + £^_1B—r (8)
fE <fB • gB)
A comparison of (7) and (8) illustrates that the assumption
of a zero social rate of discount leads to the most conser-
vative approach to resource exploitation.
4
C. J. Hanneson (1974), pp_ 5 —
II. The Model
To arrive at an empirical specification of the population
dynamics (1), it is conventionally assumed that, in the
absence of fishing, the stock grows according to a logistic
growth curve :
g(B) = a . B(Bm - B) (9)
where B is the maximum stock size under prevailing environ-
mental (space, food, etc.) conditions. As the stock approaches
the environmental carrying capacity,
declines linearly, reaching zero at B
the environmental carrying capacity, the growth rate a.(B -B)
The general catch function of equation (1), f(E, B), is now
assumed to be multiplicative, where catch is proportional to
the prodiict of effort and stock size :
f(E, B) = q . E . B (10)
Combination of (9) and (10) leads to the empirical specifi-
cation of population dynamics
Ir = a B(B - B) - q . E . B (11)
dt m
 a
The specification of the logistic growth function goes back
to Schaefer (1954); for subsequent discussion and applica-
tion, see Gordon (1954), Gulland (1961), Bell (1974), and
Cadima (1978). The logistic growth function, together with
the following catch function, forms what by Low (1975) has
been called the 'surplus-production' model, illustrating
the effect of fishing on fishing mortality. In constrast,
the 'dynamic-pool' model of Beverton and Holt (1957) focuses
on the basic parameters of population dynamics.
For discussions of the catch function of the mass-contact
form, see Gordon (1954), Paloheime and Dickie (1964), Bell
(1974), Hanneson (1974), and Cadima (1978),- 6 -
The biological equilibrium condition
a . B(Bm - B) = q . E . B (12)
gives the steady-state relation (-^r = o) between natural
growth and fishing effort. From the stock-effort equili-
brium (12), the steady-state relation between catch and
effort can be obtained by expressing (12) in terms of B,
aB - qE
B = _JE 1_
and substituting this into (10), yielding
2 _
q.E.B=q.BmE-3_.E (13)
According to (13), the steady-state catch is a parabolic
function of fishing effort. The maximum steady-state catch
level is called maximum sustainable yield (MSY). It is
apparent that as an optimality criterion MSY only takes
biological considerations into account. In constrast, eco-
nomic optimality requires consideration of the (harvesting
and user) cost of fishing. Maximization of the economic
rent of the fishery in the stationary context chosen is equi-
valent to maximization of the Lagrangean
L = p.q.E.B-w,E+A|a. B (B - B)-q . E . B| (14)
where A, again, is marginal user cost. The necessary condi-
tions for a stationary optimum are
L=p.q.B-w-A.q.B = O (15)
LTJ = p.q.E+A|aB -2aB-qE|=0 (16)
L = a . B(B -B)-q.E.B = O (17)
A m- 7 -
Solving (16) for marginal user cost
p . q . E
a Bm - 2 aB - q . E
and substituting (18) and (16) into (15) and then solving
(15) for the value of the marginal product yields
aBm-q.E p.q.E
p . q . = w
a B - q . E
a a B - 2a .
m a
a B - q . E ^4
2
where a = q . B , ao = -*—, or in functional notations, i m z a
(19)
In simplified form, this can be
p (a1 - a2 E) = w + p a2 E (20)






The second term on the right-hand side of (20), pa2E, is
marginal user cost of fishing effort. The rent-maximizing
condition
w pa^E
dictates that price must be equal to the sum of marginal
harvesting and user cost. Integrating (20) with respect to
E yields the maximum rent
12 1 2 IT = p(a.E - ^-a9E ) - -^pa^E - wE (22)
max
 l- 8 -
2 ,
where p (a.E - a^E ) is total revenue minus total user cost.
For purposes of interpretation of the empirical results in
Section IV, the profit-maximizing condition (21) (or (20))
can be rewritten as
p (a1 - 2a2E) = w (23)
According to (23), in the stationary optimum fishing effort
should be maintained at a level at which the unit cost of
effort equals the value of the marginal product of effort
net of marginal user cost of effort. The advantage of this
reformulation^ is that the empirical specification adopted
in this paper allows identification of the user cost term
pa2E.
Figure 1 shows the steady state ("sustainable") revenue-effort
relationship. With the corresponding cost curve, wE, the op-
optimal stationary effort level is E , yielding revenue R at
a cost of C . Maximum rent is R - C . o o o
Maximization of rent requires that both harvesting and user
cost enter into the profit-maximizing calculus of individual
fishermen. In general, identity of private and social maxi-
mizing behavior can only be achieved under an efficiency-
oriented property rights regime . This condition is violated
under open access to fishing grounds. Since individual pro-
perty rights over fish can, under open access, only be esta-
blished by seizure, the value of the resource in situ (the
uncaught stock) will not enter into the profit-maximizing cal-
culus of individual fishermen. Thus, user cost will be disre-
garded by individual fishermen competing in the use of a com-
monly shared stock.
The equilibrium characteristics of unregulated resource ex-
ploitation have been discussed extensively; cf. Gordon (1954),
Clark (1976 ), Peterson and Fisher (1977).- 9 -






Fishing Effort- 10 -
Under open access conditions, each fisherman i attempts




B> . E. -r wE. ,
Ci 1 -L
leading to the condition
P • f-J&r** =w.
hi
Potential future profits will not be taken into account,
since under competitive open access conditions they are
not privately appropriable in the current period. This
individual maximizing behavior leads to an industry equi-
librium where in each period
pf (E, B) - wE = o.
Expressed in terms of the specific functional forms dis-
cussed above, the stationary state of the open access fi-
shery is reached when
P (a1 E - a2 E
2) - wE =0. (24)
This corresponds to point B-, in figure 1, where the cost
curve intersects the sustainable revenue curve. Under open
access user cost is disregarded and the economic rent from
fishing is dissipated by an excessive level of effort (and
cost).
It is, of course, an empirical question whether or not the
open access equilibrium deviates markedly from the social
optimum. Abolishing the open access condition is only warran-
ted if the potential economic rent exceeds the costs of-11-
establishment and enforcement of an efficiency-oriented
Q
fishery management regime .
Efficiency-oriented fishery management requires (1)
establishment of jurisdiction (property rights) over
the fishery and (2) imposition of a user fee to capture
economic rent, if private property rights can - for po-
litical or other reasons - not be established over ocean
areas. On the institutional characteristics of such a
system, cf. Christy and Scott (1965), Christy (1972),
Scott (1979), Pearse (1979), and Prewo (1980).- 12 -
III.Application
Among major fisheries, the North Sea fishery offers a prime
testing ground for the empirical model proposed in this pa-
per. In the North Sea, overfishing has been apparent for
many years to the extend that it is even feared to have led
9
to the extinction of selected species .
As a first step towards measuring the potential economic
rent in the case of North Sea demersal species , the locus
of sustainable revenue (exclusive of user cost) - as shown
in figure 1 by
p (a., E - a2 E
2) (25)
- is estimated. Construction of the cost curve wE allows
identification of the open access equilibrium (24) and of
the stationary social optimum (23). This, in turn, allows
quantification of the maximum potential rent (23) and of
user cost.
Due to the well-known paucity of economic data on fisheries,
there have been few successful attempts at empirical appli-
cations of fishery models of the Schaefer type discussed
here. The Schaefer model assumes that the fishery is restric-
ted to a single fishing ground. This restriction is satisfac-
torily accomodated in the present study, since it chooses a
relatively large fishing ground and it restricts itself to
For evidence on the state of biological exploitation of
the North Sea fishery, cf. ICES (1976, 1978), Wilson and
Anderson (1977), Saeterdal (1978), or the 'Review of State'
series of FAO.
Demersal species are bottom-dwelling species such as cod,
haddock, plaice. They are distinguished from pelagic species
such as herring or tuna. The latter's migratory patterns are
not confined to the North Sea.dm Isst&tuta
Ms Woltwirtedssfi Kiel
- 13 -
demersal species whose migratory patterns are more narrow-
ly confined than those of other (pelagic) species. In addi-
tion the Schaefer model assumes that the fishery is direc-
ted at a single species only, whereas, in reality, biologi-
cal and technological conditions mandate a multi-species
approach . To circumvent this problem, this study suggests
an empirical scheme under which the various species in a
multi-species fishery (such as the North Sea) are aggregated
into a "composite" single species, thus retaining the empi-
rical advantages of the single-species approach. (For de-
tails on data construction and sources, see the Appendix).
The aggregation scheme offered here starts by weighing the
catch of a species by its relative price to a numeraire spe-
1 2 cies (here: cod) . Thus the total value-weighted catch in
any fishing period is given by
n
CEW = Z c. p. (26)
i-1
where CEW is total (cod-equivalent) value-weighted catch,
c. is the volume weight of species i caught, and p. is the
relative price of species i.
In Schaefer-type models, fishing is envisioned as being
carried out with a single composite factor of production,
fishing effort. Following other studies, fishing effort is
measured in terms of fishing hours of a "standard" fishing
boat . The fleet's total fishing effort expended on total
catch CEW is then given by
For this reason, cost data can also not be broken down
by individual species in a multi-species fishery.
1 2
For discussions of value-weighted catch in the management
of multi-species fisheries, see Anderson (1975),Clark (1976);
Huppert (1979) summarizes this discussion.
See the Appendix for definitions and underlying assumptions
in constructing fishing effort data in terms of the efficien-
cy unit of the standard fishing boat.- 14 -
E = CEW / c /h (27)
where c and h are catch level and fishing hours of the
standard boat, respectively.
Finally this study is restricted to annual observations
for the period from 19 54 to 19 73. During this period, un-
like at present, quotas were not imposed and fishing took
1 4 place in an open-access environment . Table 1 summarizes
the data on catch and effort for the sample period.
1 4
While quotas were not imposed during the sample period,
technological restrictions (on fishing gear) have been.
These technological restrictions, however, are widely
considered as not having led to a sizeable impact on
overfishing. Cf. references in note 9 above.- 15 -
Table 1





















































































Cod-equivalent-weights of catch have been estimated in
million tons, based on Tables A1 and A2. Estimations of
the catch per unit effort and the effort, whose units
are CEW ton per hour and million CEW tons, are based on
Table A3.- 16 -
IV. Results
1. Sustainable Revenue
As a first test, it is assumed that the fishing power of
boats changes in direct proportion to the changes in boat
tonnage. Since the tonnage characteristics of the British
fishing fleets (motor trawlers) have remained roughly con-
stant over time, this assumption implies that the produc-
tivity of the standard fishing boat is assumed to have re-
mained constant over the period under consideration. This
assumption will be relaxed later in the paper (Section IV.3).
Due to biological factors - most notably: age composition
and reproduction characteristics - current fishing influen-
cing not only current but also future harvest potentials.
However, this relationship is not known with accuracy. Lack-
ing any prior knowledge of these intertemporal effects,
three alternative regressions of the sustainable revenue-
effort relationship (25) are offered here . These regres-
sions differ only by the lag structure imposed on the inde-
pendent variables with the general regression equation be-
ing
CEWt = Ol Et_s + a2 Et_s (28)
where





In other studies, e. g. Gulland (1961), Bell (1974) the
catch-effort relationship of the quadratic functional form
is reformulated for the regression function
(|) = a + bE.
As discussed by Roff and Fairbairn (1980), there are statisti-
cal problems with a specification in which the independent
variable appears in the denominator of the dependent variable.
However, the appealing simplicity of the 'surplus-production
1
fishery model is acknowledged even by its critics, cf. Schnute
(1977) and Uhler (1980).- 17 -
The three regressions differ according to s being alter-
natively set at 1, 2, and 3, implying a lag structure in-





The individual ordinary least squares regressions results
are reported in Table 2. Since the Durbin-Watson statistics
of the OLSQ regressions are rather low, indicating positive
serial correlation, the regressions were also estimated
using the Cochrane-Orcut (CORC) procedure; these results
are also reported in Table 2. The estimated coefficient
on E (a.) carries the expected positive sign and is highly
2 significant in all regressions. The coefficient on E (a~)
is, as expected, negative in all regressions and is signifi-
cant at least at the 5 % level; regression 2
1 (CORC) is an
exception and has therefore been dropped from further dis-
cussion .
The regression results do not allow a decided judgment favor-
17
ing one lag structure over the others . As a consensus esti-
mate, the simple average of the five results is
CEW = 521.7 E - 0.0319 E
2.
Depending on the length of the life cycle, alternative lag
structures have been experimented with for individual spe-
cies fisheries; for use of current efforts see Bell (1974);
average effort.levels of current and 2 or 3 past fishing
periods are used,by Gulland (1961) and F. A. 0. (1978); 5
year averages are used by F. A. 0. (1968) .
17 2
The results show that the adjusted R falls somewhat as
longer lag structures are imposed on effort. However, the
difference in R is not sufficient evidence for discrimi-
nating among the equations.- 18 -
Table 2
Revenue-Effort Regressions of North Sea Demersal Fisheries:























































The regressions are based on the data in Table 1; the numbers
in parantheses are t-statistics; p is the final value of rho
in the iteration of the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation procedure.- 19 -
The regression results show that the sustainable revenue-
effort relationship is of the postulated inverted U-shape.
Total revenue (in terms of value-weighted catch) reaches
a maximum of 2.2 million CEW tons at an effort level of 8.2
million fishing hours: This is the level corresponding to
the biological criterion of maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
The force of declining marginal returns can be illustrated
as follows: At an effort level of 2.5 million fishing hours
(reached around 1960) a 1000 hour increase in effort raises
revenue by 362 CEW tons. On the other hand, at an effort
level of 7.5 million hours (reached at 1972), the same effort
increase would lead to a marginal revenue of only 43 CEW tons.
The average (and marginal) harvesting cost (of fishing effort)
1 8 has been calculated at 211 CEW tons per 1000 fishing hours
This can be contrasted with estimates for the variable margi-
nal user cost (pct^E) that can be derived from the regression
results. At the relatively low effort level of 2.5 million
hours, marginal user cost is 80 CEW tons (per 1000 fishing
hours), i. e., less than 40 % of marginal harvesting cost.
On the other hand, at the relatively high effort level of 7.5
million tons, marginal user cost (at 239 CEW tons) exceeds
marginal harvesting cost (211 CEW tons). In the years after
1968, marginal user cost in general exceeded marginal har-
vesting cost, which•already provides some indication of the
inefficiency implied by the open access regime.
Derivation of alternative estimates of harvesting cost,
see the Appendix.- 20 -
2. Optimal Exploitation
The revenue and cost curves estimated for the demersal
species fisheries of the North Sea can be used for a com-
parison of the implications of biological and economic
optimality criteria.
a) Economic_op_timum:
In the stationary state and in the terminology used here,
the economic optimum is reached at that level of fishing
where marginal revenue net of user cost (marginal sustain-
able revenue) equals marginal harvesting costs. For each
of the five revenue - effort relationships, estimates of
revenue, cost, effort and profit at the economic optimum
have been calculated. The detailed results are reported
in the Appendix, Table A4. The averages of these estimates
1 9 are shown in the first column of Table 3 * The optimal
fishing effort is reached at 4.9 million hours; the corres-
ponding revenue amounts to 1.8 million CEW tons. At a har-
vesting cost of 1.04 million CEW tons, this implies sus-
tainable economic rent of .76 million CEW tons, or 73 % of
harvesting cost . At this level, the marginal user cost
is 153 CEW tons per 1000 hours.
1 9
The five individual revenue estimates all fall into a
narrow band of about 5 % around the average reported in
Table 3. The individual effort estimates fall into a 10 %
band around the average reported here.
20
For comparison, the high-cost assumption implies an opti-
mal revenue of 1.5 million CEW tons, 3.7 million hours of
effort, harvesting cost of 1.06 million CEW tons, sustain-
able economic rent of .44 million CEW tons (or 41 % of har-
vesting cost), and marginal user cost of 118 CEW tons per
1000 fishing hours.- 21 -
Table 3























Revenue, cost, and rent are measured in million CEW tons,
while fishing effort is measured in million fishing hours
The low cost assumption is used in this estimation. For
details of estimates under both the low and high cost as-
sumptions , see Tables A4 and A5.- 22 -
These estimates allow an examination of the history of
the North Sea demersal fishery in the light of efficiency.
According to Table 1, the North Sea fishery has, upto
the mid-sixties, grown rapidly both in terms of value-
weighted catch (revenue) and fishing effort. Upto 1967,
catch and effort have grown at average annual rates of
7.8 % and 11 %, respectively. Increasing profits were se-
cured during that period of apparent development. In con-
21
trast, profits have been declining ever since 1968 . Fish-
ing effort jumps from 1967 to 1968 by nearly 50 %. This ex-
cessive effort level has subsequently never been cut back
to the optimal level, thus leading to continued, aggravated
overfishing. Declining profits have been the expected re-
sult of persistent overfishing, a tendency characteristic
of the open-access regime. In this period from 1968 to 1973
cost exceeded the optimal level by 46 % on average, while
revenue exceeded the optimal level by only 26 %. From 1968
to 1973, the cumulative economic rent that has been wasted
22 amounted to 370 thousand CEW tons
Biological optimality disregards costs. The criterion is
maximum sustainable yield, reached when marginal revenue
is zero. The second column of Table 3 gives the effort,
revenue, cost and profit estimates corresponding to this
optimality criterion. Accordingly, maximum sustainable
yield (revenue) is reached at 2.16 million CEW tons with
21
This observation is, again, based on the low-cost assump-
tion. The high cost assumption places the turning point
at around 1963.
22
This figure is obtained in spite of the exceptionally
good harvests of 1968 - 1970.- 23 -
a fishing effort of 8.3 million hours. At a harvesting cost
of 1.76 million CEW tons, economic profit is 0.4 million CEW
23 tons, or 23 % of cost . Except for a few years, the North
Sea demersal fishery has been carried out at levels below
MSY, implying that the stocks have not been overfished accor-
24 ding to this biological criterion
The divergence between economic optimum and biological opti-
mum (as defined by MSY) is striking. While MSY revenue ex-
ceeds the economically optimal level by 20 %, harvesting cost
at MSY is 69 % above the economically optimal level. As a
consequence, the rent at MSY is roughly only half of the op-
timal economic rent. This appears to disqualify MSY as an
appropriate guide for fishery management.
3. Technological Advance
So far in this paper, the assumption that tonnage represents
fishing power has implied the absence of technological change.
This assumption will now be relaxed. While measures of tech-
nological change in the North Sea fishery are not available,
the sensitivity of the results with respect to alternative
assumptions of technological change can be tested. Three such
sensitivity tests are provided here; in these three experi-
ments , the annual rate of technological advance is, alterna-
tively, set at 2.5 %, 5 %, and 10 %.
23
At the alternative high-cost assumption, fishing at MSY
would entail a loss of 9 % of cost. See the Appendix (Table A5).
24
Seemingly, this is not true for the years 1968, 1969, 1970,
when catch exceeded the MSY level. However, these years were
biologically abnormal years, as is shown by the fact that
effort levels were below MSY levels, while catch exceeded MSY.
In 1968, the sudden increase of catch resulted from the ex-
ceptionally good harvest of a single species, Norway pout, and
the good harvests of 1969 and 19 70 can be attributed to haddock,
Cf. Table A2 in Appendix and ICES (1975).- 24 -
Under a constant rate of technological change, the efficiency
adjusted catch per unit effort (of the standard fishing boat)
in period t becomes
CPUEt
+ = CPUEt / (1 + y)
t-
According to (27), the fishing effort, expressed in constant
units of efficiency, becomes
Et
+ = Et •• (1 + y)
t.
With averages of current and past values for E as the new
independent variable, the sustainable revenue-effort regres-
sions can be rerun. The regression results are reported in
the Appendix (Tables A6 through A8). In analogy to Table 3,
Table 4 presents results on revenue, cost, effort, and rent
for both the economic and biological optima and the technolo-
gical advance assumptions.
Technological change does not qualitatively alter the con-
clusions reached in the case of economic optimization. 1968
remains the turning point of the fishery and the start of
substantial economic overfishing. Quantitatively, the opti-
mal economic rent increases from the previous value of .76
million CEW tons - at zero technological change - to, alter-
natively, 1.01 (a = 2.5 %) , 1.24 (a = 5 %), and 1.61 (a = 10 %).
Thus, even at the most modest rate of technological advance
(2.5 %), rent exceeds harvesting cost.
With technological change, biological overfishing becomes more
evident. While under the assumption of no technological advance,
25 the criterion of MSY has not been violated with technological
25
As discussed above, the apparent violation of MSY in the years
1968 - 1970 can be attributed to abnormalities rather than to
biological overfishing.Table 4





















































Units are the same as in Table 3. Estimates are based on the low cost assumption.
Corresponding estimates based on the high cost assumption are reported in the Appen-
dix (Table A9).- 26 -
advance the years 1973 (a = 25 %) and 1971 (a =5 or 10%)
are identified as the turning points at which the fishery
moves to biological overfishing.- 27 -
V. Summary and Conclusions
The central focus of this study has been on efficiency as-
pects of fishing. Like other empirical fishery studies, this
study also has faced the obstacle posed by the lack of ad-
equate data. The hurdle is insurmountable, if the goal is an
empirical application of the dynamic models that are the
state of the art in fishery theory. In the face of these dif-
ficulties, this study has resorted to a static framework. While
this precludes the analysis of many interesting dynamic fea-
tures, it offers a stylized picture of the fishery, in which
the central efficiency questions are highlighted.
The major conclusions of the study, as applied to North Sea
demersal fisheries in the period of 1954 to 1973 are: First,
economic overfishing has become increasingly severe. While the
North Sea fishery, if managed properly, entails economic rent
of a substantial magnitude, most of that has been dissipated
under open access. The urgency of installing a restrictive
access regime is undisputed by the empirical evidence. Second,
static biological optimality criteria such as MSY are entirely
inadequate from the economic viewpoint. The considerable di-
vergence between the biological and the economic optimum does
not vindicate the casual assertion that, in the lack of better
guides of fishery management, MSY retains practical usefulness.
Without question, some of the empirical assumptions underlying
this study are open to attack. One of the major assumptions -
the absence of technological change - has been examined in de-
tail. The results show that the qualitative conclusions remain
robust to this experiment.- 28 -
Appendi x
Data Sources
Catch: The value-weights for the construction of composite
catch figures of the North Sea multi-species demersal fishe-
ry are derived (i) from absolute catch data (weight) for in-
dividual species as reported in International Council for
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) , Bulletin Statistique, vari-
ous annual issues, and (ii) on the basis of relative catch
prices of British takings as reported by the U. K. Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Sea Fisheries Statistical
Tables, various issues. The data on relative prices are re-
ported in Table A1, those on absolute catch weights in Table
A2.
Fishing Effort: This study follows the common practice of re-
lying on a composite factor of production, fishing effort.
Fishing effort is measured by fishing hours of the "standard"
boat, British motor trawlers, as reported in ICES, Bulletin
Statistique, various issues. Catch per unit of fishing ef-
fort (CPUE) is then obtained by dividing the value-weighted
catch by fishing hours of the standard boat.
Unit Cost of Fishing Effort: Direct cost data on the multi-
species fishery of the North Sea are not available. To ob-
tain proxies for the unobserved cost data, this study in-
vokes the open access equilibrium condition that, in the long
run, revenue must be at least as high as total harvesting
cost. Thus, the observed catch per unit of effort (CPUE) should
be at least as high as the unobserved unit cost of fishing ef-
fort; and, consequently, following Hanneson (1974), unit cost- 29 -
can be measured by the lowest historical level of CPUE. For
the North Sea fisheries considered here, 1973 shows the low-
est CPUE level. For the low-cost calculation reported in the
paper, the 1973 figure is used. For the high-cost calculation
the minimum of the four-year averages of CPUE over the obser-
vation period (1954 - 1973) is used. This turns out to be the
average of the years 1970 - 1973. This alternative cost figure
is offered on the presumption that the low 19 73 CPUE figure
may reflect short-run disequilibrium phenomena.Table A1

































































































































Source: "Sea Fisheries Statistical Tables", Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and- Food, U. K.Table A2









































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: 'Bulletin Statistique', ICES- 33 -
Table A4 - Economic Optimum of the North Sea Demersal Fishery






























































































Equation numbers pertain to those in Table 2. Units are the same
as in Table 3.- 34 -
Table A5 - Biological Optimum (MSY) of the North Sea Demersal Fishery

















































































































Catch-Effort Regressions; 2.5 % Technological Advance
























































Specifications are the same as Table 2.- 36 -
Table A7
Catch-Effort Regression: 5 % Technological Advance
























































Catch-Effort Regression: 10 % Technological Advance

















































































































Units are the same as in Table 3. Estimates are based in the high cost assumption,- 39 -
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